

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: 21 April 1986

REPLY TO:
ATTN OF: DT-S (Ops)

SUBJECT: SUN STREAK Operations Report CY8607 (U)

TO: DT-5A

1. (S/SK/WNINTEL) In response to your request for immediate information concerning three critical intelligence gaps surrounding the 14/15 April 1986 bombing raid over Libya, the following information is provided:

a. (S/SK/WNINTEL) In reference to your question concerning the whereabouts and condition of Mumammar Quaddafi on or about 15/16 April 1986, available sources reported somewhat similar information.

(1) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #003 described an area of numerous buildings which were "very" white, perhaps like a desert-city setting. Rounded structures were present and important (not further identified). The entire area had a sense of being surrounded or enclosed, evincing the sense of the word "compound." Some activity was taking place which was repetitive, energetic, and (exciting). There was an impression of a formation of military personnel--with a "Russian" feel (not further identified)--with weapons at port arms running and shouting down a street "going somewhere" (not further identified). A sense of excitement pervaded, as well as anticipation and apprehension. There was an impression of other people inside (not further identified) hiding or avoiding something (not further identified), who were fearful, angry, and feeling somewhat hopeless/helpless. Finally, there was the impression of a person--different

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

HANDLE VIA SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/DT
DECLASSIFY BY: OADR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-114

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

in some way than the others--who was dark complected, with dark hair (not further identified). He (Quaddafi?) was nervous, anxious, upset, waiting, expectant, unsure, a little claustrophobic, but also angry and wanting to "get away". He was confined in a small, lighted room with dingy white walls with a stuffy feeling. Politics seemed to be involved, as well as the idea of insurance, collateral, or "trump card." Presence, or even existence of the individual was secret, not disclosed, "kept for a surprise." He may have been slightly injured and "hurting," perhaps "slightly burned." Source provided no further amplifying information concerning the whereabouts and condition of Mumammar Quaddafi on or about 15/16 April 1986.

(2) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #018 described an area of flat land, possibly surrounded by low hills, making a very shallow valley (not further identified). In this area was a squarish, multistory perhaps "capped-top" building surrounded, but separated from other buildings (not further identified). A man, who may have met Quaddafi's description, was believed by source to have been in an "ornate" room inside this building engaged in a heated discussion with another man. Source described this other man as older, somewhat heavy set, wearing a black or dark colored suit. This other man seemed to be accustomed to power and position. He was tired, aggravated with (Quaddafi?), and somewhat condescending toward him. Source provided no further amplifying information concerning the whereabouts and condition of Mumammar Quaddafi on or about 15/16 April 1986.

(3) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #021 described a heavily guarded compound of structures. The structures were light in color, rough in texture and built low to the ground. They were heavily barricaded. Area was dry and parched and located in an isolated area, i.e., not in a city--more open country (not further identified). It was hot, almost tropical, and there was a very dusty, dirty taste. There were many people at the site--dark skinned, male and female. Some were very frightened, some very angry and some of the people were in pain. There was much confusion and a sound of rumbling in the background.

The most heavily guarded structure was a combination of living quarters, storage space for what was perceived to be large wooden crates, food supplies, and other equipment (not further identified). This building also contained a large, sour smelling, smoky room cluttered with debris. This room was heavily guarded, with only a

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

few people who were the key players (Quaddafi and cadre?). Emotions were high, bordering on irrationality. These people were dangerous, treacherous and cunning. They were concerned only with their own objectives, not consequences. Source provided no further amplifying information concerning the whereabouts and condition of Mumammar Quaddafi on or about 15/16 April 1986.

(4) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #101 described flat, rolling and up/down land with lots of sand, bushes and some small trees. A small mountain or a large hill wrapped perhaps three quarters of the way around this place. The area was away from everything; lights of a (distant) town (not further identified) may have been visible from the crest of the hill. There were abandoned, delapidated low structures here made of natural material; stone and an adobe like material. There were temporary structures (not further identified) scattered about too. There was an abandoned landing strip here also and the area had the feel of an abandoned "Company Town." There were automatic weapons and something which may have been a temporary radar in the hills above the assembly area (not further identified). This area may have been receiving supplies via helicopters (not further identified), which came in occasionally.

In the area there were fresh smells and gasoline smells, but the most powerful smell was of exhaust fumes. There were vehicle noises and military vehicles here--jeeps, lorries, vehicles with very large rubber tires, and possibly a few tanks. The tanks were modern and gray in color (not further identified). Camouflage netting was in use throughout the area and appeared to be very effective. A large group of men (Quaddafi and troops?) was gathered here--possibly 300 to 500 (not further identified). The primary color of clothing was khaki but they were not really military uniforms; "semi-uniform is the best word." The men were armed with some having bandoliers across their bodies.

There was a very intense feeling here, bleak and somber. There was a lot of excitement and some conflicting emotions here. "The motor oil smells and the adrenalin smells blend together." These men were on alert. They were angry, anxious and at loose ends; filled with emotion and feelings of revenge and renewal. There was a feeling among many of the men of "at last." There is a sense of resignation and also of relief. The men were "simpatico" and "macho" and had a common purpose. The men were concerned with the reality

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

of things, not with abstract concepts. They had been waiting here for awhile for a "word" or a "signal" to move. Most of the men did not know where they were going but they knew they would move in mass to a city (not further identified). Source provided no further amplifying information concerning the whereabouts and condition of Mumammar Quaddafi on or about 15/16 April 1986.

b. (S/SK/WNINTEL) In reference to your question concerning the whereabouts of the missing Air Force F-111 believed downed in conjunction with the bombing raid over Libya on 14/15 April 1986, three of the four available sources reported strikingly similar information.

(1) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #003 described an area which seemed first to involve a structure on land, perhaps a large, damaged masonry building. Later, however, a persistent impression developed of a swirling around cloud with a stinging, acidic smell, grey, cream colored, and brown in color. This was followed by an even more persistent idea of some sort of manmade object under lots of water, resting on sand with land off to the left. The Arabic phrase of "tahta al-ma'e" ("under the water") spontaneously presented itself. Source provided no further amplifying information concerning the whereabouts of the missing Air Force F-111 believed downed in conjunction with the bombing raid over Libya on 14/15 April 1986.

(2) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #018 described an area of open salt water. There was an oddly shaped column of water/steam/radiant heat which was rising up out of the surrounding water, and was circling, falling, moving in all directions. There were two distinct sounds: deep rumbling and splashing. Moments before this, the area was cold, windy, and there was a distant roar with a "popping" sound which was may have been a plane in trouble. Source provided no further amplifying information concerning the whereabouts of the missing Air Force F-111 believed downed in conjunction with the bombing raid over Libya on 14/15 April 1986.

(3) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #021 described an area of deep, cold, salty water like an ocean. Source provided no further amplifying information concerning the whereabouts of the missing Air Force F-111 believed downed in conjunction with the bombing raid over Libya on 14/15 April 1986.

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(4) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #101 provided no information which could be interpreted as the location of the missing Air Force F-111 believed downed in conjunction with the bombing raid over Libya on 14/15 April 1986.

c. (S/SK/WNINTEL) In reference to your question concerning the next (15-25 April 1986) terrorist strike, there was no continuity of opinion nor corroborative similarities among the four available sources.

(1) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #003 described an area with an unusual large, circular supported metal structure with lots of angles located on high, rocky, sparsely vegetated terrain. Weather was cool, grey, dismal; few people were present. Structure had an "official" purpose, perhaps monitoring or relay, contained equipment (not further identified), and was isolated. The location had a Mediterranean feel like a Greek island, though the structure seemed U.S. related. Some unsuspecting threat existed (not further identified), of which the few people present were unaware, but would not have surprised them had they known. They were doing some routine job. They were "not fully prepared," and relatively "undefended." At a later time (unspecified) a person dressed in dark clothes of a uniform color was sitting somewhere inside the structure "paying attention to" something (not further identified). There was also heightened activity amongst people associated with purpose of the location, concerning some outside event--a sense of "tracking" (not further identified). On approximately 20 April 1986, there was a low-level sense of alarm including the concepts of flashes, reports, smoke, and confusion; possible distant reverberations (not further identified). Thereafter, tension abruptly decreased and continued so throughout the rest of the month. Source provided no further amplifying information concerning the next (15-25 April 1986) terrorist strike.

(2) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #018 provided no information which could be readily interpreted as the location of the next (15-25 April 1986) terrorist strike.

(3) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Source #021 described a large, populated city with an international and very old ambience. The streets were narrow and crowded and there were many tall, narrow white buildings like long blocks of row houses. There was a lot of noise in the city, traffic sounds, machinery, and people. People here were

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

a mixture of nationalities and the city had a tourist feeling. There was a very reserved feel to this city; polite, dignified, like London. Source reported, that the concept of the "London Underground" seemed most important to this area. Source provided no further amplifying information concerning the next (15-25 April 1986) terrorist strike.

(4) (S/SK/WNINTEL) Although source #101 provided no information which could be readily interpreted as the location of the next (15-25 April 1986) terrorist strike, he did relate information which may, in some as yet unidentified manner, be relevant to the greater overall current situation revolving around the recent 14/15 April 1986 bombing raid over Libya. Source #101 described a "mixed" area of a city (not further identified), wherein there were warehouses, shops and apartments. The majority of the inhabitants appeared to be middle age to old (not further identified). The important structure here was a warehouse, a medium to large building which had two corrugated metal doors facing the street. This warehouse had a high ceiling, concrete floors, and no windows. There was an underground storage area here, like a cellar. It was cool inside the warehouse and most of the people working inside were wearing sweaters or jackets.

There were two different groups of men working inside the warehouse. One group was dark skinned. The other group was fair skinned and appeared slavic. Dark skinned men were the workers and in the majority. Fair skinned men were supervising, although some of them were also working. There were guards here, all of which were slavic. This place had the feeling of an armory (not further identified). Men were storing weapons and communications equipment here. Weapons were rifles, machine guns and missiles. Rifles were in long boxes and packed in straw. Missiles were cylindrical, about five feet long and four or five inches in diameter (not further identified). These missiles were packed very carefully, each one in its own cylindrical crate with packing and straw packed around. There was a lot of bustle and excitement here. The weapons and equipment may have been airlifted in and then brought here by truck (not further identified).

One of the slavic men was 33 to 35 years old. He was dressed in a short sleeve shirt and slacks and was very "nondescript." He was armed with a hand gun and considered himself a Russian--not Soviet. He was a military intelligence officer with a speciality of translation/interrogation linguistics. He had been in

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

this country (not further identified) for two days and immediately upon arrival came to this warehouse. He was one of the first people at the warehouse. He came from another country not to far away (not further identified). He was here on a mission and his orders came from the "Kremlin." He was to prepare this place (not further specified) but he was not aware why. He felt good about being here and he was excited. There were about forty more Soviets here. They were guards, communicators, translators, and workers. They all were dressed in civilian clothes. Source provided no further amplifying information.

2. (S/SK/WNINTEL) It is recommended that the information provided by source #003 be considered most reliable. Information provided by this source appears to be corroborated by fellow sources in respect to the first two questions and is not inconsistent with anticipated events in the case of the third question, even though such events may have been prevented by prophylactic measures since source #003 perceptions occurred. It is also recommended that the information provided by source #003 be considered reliable for similar reasons; with the exception that source #021 exhibited a lack of self confidence in relating perceptions pertaining to question three.

3. (S/SK/WNINTEL) In specific reference to your question concerning the next (15-25 April 1986) terrorist strike, the available sources may have been unable to adequately address this question because of its semantic intricacies. "Terrorist strikes" may included those planned (but not executed), those prevented, those conducted and reported, and those unreported, etc. Additionally, there will surely be several terrorists strikes during the time period 15-25 April 1986. The sources are unaccustomed to accessing and describing similar yet geographically separate multiple events occurring over a specified period of time.

4. (S/SK/WNINTEL) Direct access to raw transcript information is limited to personnel with SKEET access only. If access to this information is necessary, contact DT-S (Ops) directly to arrange for an appointment to review appropriate transcripts. SKEET documents are not releasable outside the confines of the SUN STREAK office.

5. (S/SK/WNINTEL) Enclosed herewith is a Summary Evaluation Sheet. Please annotate it appropriately and return it to DT-S (Ops) within 30 days of receipt of this SUN STREAK Operations

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100190009-2

~~SECRET~~

Report. Care and diligence in annotating this Summary Evaluation Sheet will aid in the refinement of SUN STREAK assets and thereby enhance SUN STREAK's ability to provide further information of intelligence value.

SG1J

1 Enclosure
Summary Evaluation Sheet

[REDACTED]
CPT, USA
Operations Officer

~~SECRET~~